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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff\Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID A. GALLEGOS, 
Defendant\Appellant 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a Sentence of five years to life after a 
conviction of Burglary, a Second Degree Felony in violation of 
U.C.A. § 76-6-202 after a jury trial with the Honorable Michael D. 
Lyon presiding. The appellant was tried in the Second District 
Court of Weber County on the 20th and 21st days of May, 1996. 
On June 21, 1995, the Appellant was sentenced pursuant to 
U.C.A. §76-3-203.5, as a habitual criminal, to serve a term of five 
years to life on the charge of Burglary, and a term of six months 
on the charge of Theft. The Appellant's sentences are to be served 
concurrently to each other, but consecutive to all other sentences 
previously imposed. Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal 
is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-
2a-3'2)(f) (1953, as amended) and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
• 
* 
• 
• 
• 
•k 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case Nc. 960454-CA 
Fr-QT':v No. 2 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
The trial court committed error when it sentenced the 
Appellant as an habitual offender under U.C.A. §76-3-203.5 to an 
enhanced sentence of five years to life on the conviction of 
Burglary, a second degree felony. 
Standard of Review 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness, granting no deference to a trial courts determination. 
Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2 84 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 7 (Ct. App. 
1996) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
U.C.A § 76-3-203 .5 Habitual Violent Offender - Definition -
Procedure - Penalty 
(1) As provided in this section: 
(a) "Felony" means any offense against a criminal 
statute of the state, any other state, the United States, or 
any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
for which the maximum punishment the offender may be subjected 
to exceeds one year in prison. 
(b) "Habitual violent offender" means a person convicted 
within the state of any violent felony and who, on at least 
two previous occasions as prided in Subsection (2), has been 
convicted of a violent felony and committed to either prison 
in Utah or an equivalent correctional institution of another 
state or of the United States either at initial sentencing or 
after revocation of probation. 
(c) (i) "Violent felony" means an felony violation of: 
(P) aggravated robbery and robbery under 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3, Robbery; 
(ii) any felony offense against a criminal statute 
of any other state, the United States, or any 
district, possession, or territory of the United 
States which could constitute a violent felony as 
defined in this subsection if committed in this 
state. 
2 
U.C.A. § 76-4-101 Attempt 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an 
attempt tc commit a crime if, acting wich zhe kind of culpa-
bility otherwise required for the commission of the offense, 
he engages in conduct cor.^cituting a substantial step tcvard 
commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct dees not constitute a 
substantial seep unless it is strongly corroborative of the 
actor's intent to commit the offense. 
U.C.A. § 76-6-301 Robbery- -- Current Statute 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or 
attempts to take personal propert" :~ the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against 
his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person i;ice**cionally or knowingly uses force or 
fear of immediate force against another in the course of 
committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing 
a theft'1 if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commis-
sion of theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commissi::... 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
U.C.A. §76-6-301 Robbery -- Old Statute 
(1) Robbery is zhe unlawful and intentional taking of 
personal property in the possession of another from his 
person, or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished 
by means of force or fear. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
U.C.A. § 76-8-1001 Habitual criminal - Determination. 
(Repealed 1995) 
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and 
committed for felony offenses at least one of which offenses 
having been at least a second degree felony or a crime which, 
if committed within this state would have been a capital 
felony, first degree felony, or second degree felony, and was 
committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a 
second degree felony committed in this state, other than 
aggravated murder or murder, be determined as a habitual 
criminal and be imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
vears to life. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant was convicted of Burglary, a Second Degree 
Felony, and Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor, after a jury trial in the 
Second District Court of Weber County. The Appellant now appeals 
based upon the fact that the trial court committed error when it 
sentenced him as an habitual criminal, when attempted robbery was 
not an offense specifically enumerated as a violent offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged with Burglary, a second degree 
felony, and Theft, a class A misdemeanor in the Second Circuit 
Court in Weber County in December of 1994. 
The Defendant went to trial on December 4, 1995. The 
prosecutor elicited improper testimony from a witness. Defense 
counsel moved the court for a mistrial and the motion was granted. 
(Trial T. 35) On May 21, 1996, a second trial was held, and the 
Defendant was convicted of the burglary and theft. (Trial T. 175) 
Prior to the second trial, the State notified the trial court 
and the Defendant, by information, of their intent to seek 
sentencing pursuant to the habitual criminal statute found at 
U.C.A. § 76-3-203.5. The State's assertion that the Defendant was 
a habitual criminal was based upon his prior convictions of 
Attempted Robbery in 1981 and his conviction of Burglary in 1983. 
Both parties submitted memorandums addressing the habitual offender 
statute as it applied to this case. (Addendum A) 
Prior to the Defendant's first trial, the legislature amended 
the Theft statute to make the offense a class B misdemeanor, 
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repealed the habitual offender provision found in U.C.A. § 76-8-
1001 and enacted in its place U.C.A § 76-3-203.5 (effective May 1, 
1995) , and amended the Robbery provision U.C.A. 76-6-301 to include 
the crime of attempted robbery. 
The current robbery statute found at U.C.A. §76-6-301 includes 
the crime of attempted robbery. At the time that the defendant was 
convicted of attempted robbery, the crime was addressee binder a 
separate "attempt" provision of the Utah Code, U.C.A. § 76-4-101. 
The Defendant's conviction of attempted robbery is not a violent 
offense as defined under the current habitual criminal statute. 
The current statute, U.C.A. §76-3-203.5 (c) (i) (P) , provides that 
Robbery and Aggravated Robbery are violent felonies. However, the 
statute does not list Attempted Robbery as a violent felony. 
At sentencing, the State argued that the Defendant's convic-
tion of attempted robbery was a violent offense because attempted 
robbery was now pare of the Robbery statute. (Sentencing T. 2-7) 
The sentencing court found that the Defendant's conviction of 
Attempted Robbery was a violent offense for purposes of the new 
habitual criminal statute, and that the new habitual offender 
statute applied to the Defendant's case. (Sentencing T. 13 14 & 
Addendum B) • 
Over the objections of defense counsel, the sentencing court 
sentenced the Defendant as a habitual criminal and imposed a 
sentence of five years to life for the conviction of Burglary and 
six months for the conviction of Theft. These sentences were 
ordered to run concurrent to each other and consecutive to all 
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other previous felony convictions the Defendant was serving. 
(Sentencing 14-19) 
Appellant now appeals his sentence based upon the fact that 
the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him as an 
habitual offender. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The current habitual criminal statute, U.C.A. §76-3-203.5, 
specifically defines offenses which are considered violent felonies 
for the purposes of penalty enhancement within the State of Utah. 
The statute defines Robbery and Aggravated Robbery, but specifical-
ly excludes of Attempted Robbery. The reliance upon this statute 
to enhance the Appellants sentence was erroneous since the 
Appellant had not been convicted of Robbery as the statute now 
requires. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT 
SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS AN HABITUAL 
CRIMINAL PURSUANT TO U.C.A. § 76-3-203.5 
The trial court committed error when it found that the 
Appellant's previous conviction of Attempted Robbery was a violent 
offense as defined by U.C.A. §76-3-203.5. Statutory interpretation 
is a question of law reviewed for correctness, granting no 
deference to a trial courts determination. Bellonio v. Salt Lake 
City Corp.. 284 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Ct. App. 1996) 
The Appellant was convicted of Attempted Robbery in 1981. At 
the time of his conviction, U.C.A. §76-6-301 stated "robbery is the 
unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in the 
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possession of another from his person or immediate presence, 
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear". Robbery 
was a felony of the second degree* At that time, attempts were 
codified under U.C.A. §76-4-101 which stated: "for purposes of 
this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step towards the commission of the offense." 
In 199 5, the Utah State Legislature amended the Robbery 
statute as well as the Habitual Offender statute. The current 
robbery statute incorporates attempted robbery as an element of 
robbery. Therefore, there is no separate offense of Attempted 
Robbery, and a person guilty of an attempt to commit robbery will 
be convicted of Robbery. 
The current habitual criminal statute specifically defines 
offenses which are considered violent felonies. Two of those 
offense are aggravated robbery and robbery. Attempted robbery was 
excluded under the new statute as a violent offense. Had the 
former habitual criminal statute, U.C.A. §76-8-1001 applied to the 
Appellant in this case, there would be no question that his 1981 
conviction of Attempted Robbery and his 1983 conviction of Burglary 
would qualify. However, the classification of the 1981 conviction 
as Attempted Robbery precludes the court from applying it to the 
current habitual offender statute. Thereby making the Appellant 
exempt from an enhancement pursuant to that section. 
In determining legislative intent, the appellate courts have 
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consistently ruled that "the best evidence of the legislature's 
intent is the plain meaning of the statute." Nixon v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995). The plain meaning of this 
statute expressly enumerates offenses which are considered violent 
felonies. Attempted Robbery is not one of them. The legislature 
knew what they are doing. If they intended to cover prior 
"attempted" offenses, they would have enacted a provision to 
include attempted robbery. 
The plain language of the statute leads one to believe that 
the legislature specifically excluded attempted crimes because 
they, by their very nature, involve a lesser degree of conduct; as 
evidenced by the fact that an Attempted Robbery in 1981 was a third 
degree felony. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
recently look at a similar issue and ruled that Attempted Burglary 
could not be used for enhancement purposes when Burglary was a 
predicate offense. In making that ruling the Court stated: "We 
cannot conclude that Congress intended implicitly to include 
attempted burglary as a violent offense when it specified burglary 
as a violent felony under 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). If Congress intended 
attempted burglary to be a predicate offense, therefore, it must 
fall within the category of. offenses which 'otherwise involve[] 
conduct that presents a serous potential risk of physical injury to 
another.,n 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (2) (B) (ii) . Further, the Court stated 
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that the statute "should be construed narrowly and applied only to 
those categories of offenses which clearly meet the statutory 
test". United States v. Strahl, 938 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992) 
Similarly, in this case, if the Legislature intended Attempted 
Robbery to be included as a violent felony, they should have 
specifically enumerated it as such. This Court cannot find that 
the Legislature intended to cover attempts under the previous code 
when they failed to specifically delineate it as a violent felony. 
CONCLUSION 
In enacting the current habitual offender statute, the 
legislature specifically enumerated offenses which they considered 
as violent f-l~nies. Attempted Robbery was not specifically 
defined as a vi^ent felony, and therefore should not considered by 
the trial court when it enhanced the Appellant's sentence. Based 
upon the foregoing, this Court must reverse the Appellant's current 
sentence and remand the case back to the trial court for 
resentencing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ ^ day of December) 1996 
^1 
At to rney Trrr—Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and 
correct copies of the above and foregoing Brief to the following: 
Attorney General's Office 
ATTN: Criminal Appeals 
150 East 300 South, 6th floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
DATED this 
,y vf day of December, 19>6* 
Cent^; 
Attorney for Apjpe! 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, 
INC., OF WEBER COUNTY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203 
Ogden, Utah 8 44 01 
Telephone: (801) 392-8247 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs 
DAVID A. GALLEGOS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S POSITION 
NOT TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT 
AS AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL 
Case No. 941900938 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney, John 
T. Caine, and hereby submits this Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Position that he should not be Sentenced as an 
Habitual Criminal, pursuant to Section 76-3-203.5 as amended, of 
the Utah Code Annotated. 
FACTS 
The Defendant has reviewed the facts as set forth in para-
graphs one through six of the State's Memorandum, and agrees 
with the facts submitted, one through five. Paragraph six is 
argumentative and is not a fact, and therefore Defendant does not 
agree with paragraph number six. 
Two additional facts should be included. In 1981, when the 
Defendant was convicted for Attempted Robbery, a Third Degree 
Felony, the robbery provision then in place was Section 76-6-301, 
which stated that "robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking 
of personal property in the possession of another from his person 
or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means 
of force or fear, and that robbery was a felony of the second 
degree." "Attempt" was defined in a separate section, 76-4-101, 
which indicated that "for purposes of this part a person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind 
of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the 
offense, engages in conduct constituting a substantial step 
towards the commission of the offense." 
DISCUSSION 
The Defendant agrees with the State's position that had the 
former habitual criminal statute, 76-8-1001, (U.C.A., 1953) 
applied to the Defendant in this case, there would be no question 
that his 1981 and 1983 convictions would qualify, and the penalty 
enhancement could be utilized. However, it is important to note 
that it was the State by motion, who insisted that the new 
habitual violent offender statute, which was enacted by the 
Legislature effective May 1, 1995, be applicable in this in-
stance, and it is the confusion resulting from the State's 
position and the 1981 conviction for Attempted Robbery that is 
the gravamen of this case. 
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In effect, the State has been, in the old vernacular, 
"hoisted on their own petard." Under the current habitual 
criminal statute, it defines specifically offenses which are 
considered violent felonies. Two of those offenses are aggra-
vated robbery and robbery. Attempted robbery is not defined 
under the new statute because, as the State correctly points out, 
under the new robbery provision of the Utah Code, 76-3-301, the 
definition of robbery includes as a separate element, an attempt. 
This was not the case in 1981 when the Defendant was convicted of 
Attempted Robbery. At that time, the robbery statute did not 
include attempted robbery, and attempted offenses were defined in 
a separate section, 76-4-101. As such, the State is faced with 
the unfortunate dichotomy that under the present habitual 
criminal statute, attempted robbery is not defined as a violent 
offense, and attempted robbery in 1981 was not part of the 
robbery statute which is currently defined as a violent offense. 
The State now seeks to some how extrapolate some form of 
legislative intent, which is not readily apparent, and convince 
this Court that it should ignore the plain language of the 
existing statute. The plain language is that in 1981 the 
Defendant was convicted of Attempted Robbery, an offense which at 
that time was not contained within the robbery statute. No 
matter how hard the State tries to confuse the issue, the fact is 
that in 1981, based upon the Defendant's conduct, he was con-
victed of only Attempted Robbery. In 1995, had the same conduct 
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been submitted to a judge or jury, he would have been convicted 
of robbery, which is one of the enumerated offenses in the 
habitual violent offenders statute, attempted robbery is not. 
Because attempted robbery is not one of the enumerated offenses, 
the Defendant therefore does not meet the criteria of the 
habitual criminal. The legislature presumably knows what they 
are doing, and if they intended to cover prior offenses which 
were "attempted" offenses not included within the actual offense, 
how easy it would have been for them to simply enact a provision 
which codified that recognition of the differences in the concept 
of attempt as amended under the new law. An equally compelling 
argument can be made that the legislative intent was not to 
include attempted offenses that were separate, because they, by 
their very nature, involve lesser degrees of conduct, as evi-
denced by the fact that an Attempted Robbery in 1981 is a 3rd 
Degree Felony, whereas a conviction for Robbery including attempt 
in 1995 is a 2nd Degree Felony. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should not impose the 
Habitual criminal penalties against the Defendant in this case. 
DATED this i / day of June, 
r~r~ 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
— -- - -
I hereby certify that I did hand deliver a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Position not to Sentence Defendant as an Habitual Criminal/ this 
\C\ 
_day of June, 1996, to Gary R. Heward, Deputy Weber County 
Attorney, 2549 Washington Blvd., 7th Floor, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
SECRETARY 
foer> fjtiltr: 
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GARY R. HEWARD, UBN 5085 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE 
7TH FLOOR MUNICIPAL BUILDING 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801)399-8377 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF STATE'S POSITION TO 
Plaintiff, : SENTENCE DEFENDANT AS AN 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL 
vs. 
DAVID A. GALLEGOS, : Case No. 94190093 8 
Defendant. : Judge MICHAEL D. LYON 
COMES NOW Gary R. Heward, Deputy Weber County Attorney, in and for the State of 
Utah and hereby submits this Memorandum In Support of State's Position to Sentence Defendant 
as an Habitual Criminal pursuant to Section 76-3-203.5 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
FACTS 
1. Defendant was convicted in May, 1996 of the offense of Burglary. This is a 
second degree felony offense. 
2. The Defendant has been previously convicted of two violent felony offenses in the 
State of Utah: (1) a 1981 conviction for attempted robbery, a third degree felony; (2) a 1983 
conviction for burglary, a second degree felony. The State has therefore charged the Defendant 
i°:p{ 
with being an habitual criminal, a penalty enhancement provision applicable to individuals 
convicted of a violent felony who have at least two prior convictions for violent felonies which 
resulted in commitment to prison. 
3. In 1995, the Utah Legislature repealed the habitual offender provision, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-8-1001, 1002 (1991) effective May 1, 1995 and enacted in its place Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203.5 (1995). Copies of these provisions are attached. 
4. In 1995, the Utah Legislature amended the Robbery provision, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-301(1995) to include the crime of attempted robbery. This crime had previously been 
addressed under the attempt provision, Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101. Copies of these provisions 
are attached. 
5. In February of 1996, the State submitted, and this court accepted, a Memorandum 
of Law which articulated the reasons for applying the 1995 statute to the Defendant in the present 
case. 
6. The State asks this court to find that, although not articulated, attempted robbery 
is a "violent felony" pursuant to § 76-3-203.5 Utah Code Ann. (1995). 
DISCUSSION 
Attempted robbery, as defined in the amended robbery provision, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
301 (1995)("Current Robbery Provision"), is a violent felony, and the Habitual Violent Offender 
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Statute thereby applies to Defendant. Because the changes to the Habitual Criminal Statute were 
entirely procedural, the current Habitual Violent Offender statute ("New Habitual Offender 
Statute") applies in this case. The new Habitual Offender Statute is codified as Utah Code Ann § 
76-3-203.5(1995). 
Under the old Habitual Offender Statute, Defendant would have been subject to the 
enhancement, as the Defendant had twice been convicted, sentenced, and committed for felony 
offenses, one of which (November, 1983 burglary offense) was at least a second degree felony. 
The old Habitual Criminal Statute provides: 
Habitual Criminal — Determination. 
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed for 
felony offenses at least one of which offenses having been at least a second 
degree felony or a crime which, if committed within this state would have 
been a capital felony, first degree felony, or second degree felony, and was 
committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a second degree 
felony committed in this state, other than aggravated murder or murder, be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned in the state prison for 
from five years to life. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1991). 
Under the new Habitual Offender Statute, the previous convictions must fit into one of 
many enumerated "violent" offenses. Subsection (P) provides that robbery as defined by the 
current robbery provision, § 76-6-301, is such an offense. Under the current robbery provision, 
"a person commits robbery if. . . the person lawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take . . 
. " property by means of force or fear. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1995)(emphasis added). 
J 
Clearly, attempted robbery falls under this provision, and would be considered a "violent felony' 
for purposes of the new habitual offender provision. 
It runs contrary to legislative intent and public policy to allow this defendant to take 
advantage of the "straddling" position of his offenses and the amended statute in order to avoid 
the enhancement to habitual offender. The attempted robbery conviction would have met the 
criteria for habitual offender status under the old habitual offender statute. Moreover, if 
Defendant were convicted of attempted robbery today, it would fall under the new classifications 
for habitual offender status. The problem lies in the fact that the Court must apply the new 
habitual offender statute to the old attempted robbery statute. 
ARGUMENT 
L Attempted Robbery is a Violent Offense 
In 1995, the Utah Legislature amended the Utah Robbery Statute, Section 76-6-301 of the 
Utah Code Ann., to include the attempt to commit robbery. This broad definition of robbery, 
which the legislature intended, should also be construed as the definition intended under the 
robbery provision of the new Habitual Offender Statute, section 76-3-203.5(l)(c)(i)(P) of the 
Utah Code, which was also enacted in 1995. 
The old Habitual Offender Statute, section 76-8-1001, did not require prior offenses to fall 
into enumerated categories. Instead, a person who had been convicted of two previous felony 
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offenses, only one of which needed to be a second degree felony, was subject to habitual criminal 
status upon conviction of a third offense, which was at least a second degree felony. Clearly, 
defendant's prior convictions for burglary (2d degree felony) and attempted robbery (3d degree 
felony) would have satisfied his classification as an habitual offender upon this most recent 
conviction for burglary (2d degree felony). 
Moreover, the Utah Court of Appeals, in a recent decision, has stated that "crimes of 
violence are defined as such because of the substance of the offense." State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 
238, 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In Gurr, the defendant appealed his conviction of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person by maintaining that, because his previous offense had 
been sentenced as a misdemeanor, he could not be considered a "restricted person." The court 
stated that the defendant's status as a restricted person was "based on the substance rather than 
the classification of [his] criminal history." IdL at 243. By way of analogy, the court stated that 
"burglary is a violent crime not because it is a felony but because it is a forceful invasion of 
another's property." Id at 244. In the present case, Defendant's conviction of attempted robbery 
is a violent felony because of the substance of the crime, rather than the classification. Attempted 
robbery, even under the old Robbery Statute, required the same criminal intent as the completed 
act. That, coupled with the legislative intent, clearly shows that attempted robbery is a violent 
offense. 
The Court of Appeals has demonstrated that offenses are considered "violent" by virtue of 
5 
their substance, rather than their classification. In order to preserve the spirit of the law, 
defendant's prior conviction for attempted robbery should be considered as an enumerated offense 
pursuant to section of the new Habitual Offender Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.5(l)(c)(I)(P)(1995). 
EL The Legislature Intended for the Habitual Offender Statute to Apply to 
Attempted Robbery. 
The purpose of the habitual offender statute is to "make persistent offenders subject to 
greater sanctions." State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah 1983). To allow the defendant 
to circumvent the spirit of the law because of fortuitous timing would be against public policy and 
the intent of the Utah Legislature. 
Subsection 2(a) of the current Habitual Offender Statute states that ~[t]he penalty 
enhancement provisions of this section apply, if during the ten years immediately preceding the 
commission of the violent felony, the person has been . . . convicted of any felony." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.5(2)(a) (1995). The natural reading of this section is that the statute applies to 
any offenses committed in the past ten years which would be classified as a violent offense under 
the statute. This is further emphasized by the language of subsection l(c)(ii), which reads, in 
relevant part: "any felony offense against a criminal statute of any other state . . . which would 
constitute a violent felony as defined in this subsection if committed in this state." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.5(l)(c)(ii)(1995). It is simply not logical that, had the defendant committed 
attempted robbery in another state in 1981, it would fall under the enumerated offenses because it 
6 
"would constitute a violent felony as defined in this subsection if committed in this state," Id. 
(emphasis added), but, because the offense was committed in Utah, it may not fall under the 
enumerated offenses. This cannot be what the legislature intended. 
CONCLUSION 
Because attempted robbery is considered a "violent offense" for purposes of the new 
Habitual Offender Statute, and would have satisfied the conditions for habitual offender status 
under the old Habitual Offender Statute, the enhancement provision should be applied to the 
Defendant's sentence. This is consistent with legislative intent and public policy. The State 
therefore requests that this Court apply the Habitual Violent Offender enhancement to the 
Defendant's sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / j L day of June, 1996. 
GAR££i HEWARD 
DEPUTY WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ADDENDUM "B" 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
vs. : Case No. 941900938 
DAVID A. GALLEGOS, 
Defendant. : JUDGE MICHAEL D. LYON 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on State's Motion to Sentence Defendant 
as an Habitual Criminal. Defendant has been convicted of Burglary, a second degree felony, and 
Theft, a class A misdemeanor. Defendant has been twice before been convicted of felony 
offenses. The Court makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 20, 1996, Defendant was tried before a jury and found guilty as charged 
of the offenses of burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a class A misdemeanor. 
2. Defendant had previously been convicted of numerous offenses. Of relevance: a 
1983 conviction for burglary, a second degree felony; a 1981 conviction for attempted robbery, a 
third degree felony. 
3. In light of these previous convictions, the State charged the Defendant with being 
an habitual criminal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 76-3-203.5 (1995) (hereinafter unew 
habitual offender statute"). 
4 In 1995, the Utah legislature repealed the habitual offender provision, Utah Code 
Ann § 76-8-1001, 1002 (1991) ("old habitual offender statute'), and enacted in its place the new 
habitual offender statute, Utah Code Ann § 76-3-203 5 (1995) 
5 The new statute enumerates offenses which are to be considered "violent offenses' 
for purposes of applying the new habitual criminal statute to defendants Subsection (P) of this 
statute lists Robbery as a violent offense 
6 Also in 1995, the legislature amended the Robbery statute to incorporate the crime 
of attempted robbery Utah Code Ann § 301 (1995) Therefore, attempted robbery is 
considered a violent offense for purposes of the new habitual criminal statute 
7 The crimes for which Defendant was convicted on May 20 1996 were committed 
in 1994 The delay in bnngmg the Defendant to tnal was caused by Defendant's failure to appear 
for the original tnal date in June 1995 A second tnal wai> set for December 1995, and Defendant 
moved for additional information after a jury had been impaneled, further delaying the trial 
8 In February of 1996, this Court determined that the changes in the habitual 
offender statute were procedural in nature, and therefore, the new habitual offender statute would 
apply in Defendant's case 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 Defendant is properly charged as an habitual criminal pursuant to the new habitual 
criminal statute Utah Code Ann § 76-3-203 5 (1995) 
2 Defendant stipulated to the pnor convictions, to wit a 1983 conviction for 
burglary, a second degree felony, and a 1981 conviction for attempted robbery 
2 
3. Defendant would have properly been charged as an habitual criminal under the old 
habitual criminal statute, as the requirement of being twice before "convicted, sentenced, and 
committed for felony offenses at least one of which offenses having been at least a second degree 
felony" have been satisfied. 
4. Defendant is properly charged under the new habitual criminal statute, as the 
amendments to the statute are procedural in nature. 
5. Attempted robbery is considered a violent offense for purposes of the new habitual 
criminal statute. 
6. The Legislative intent is clear in that attempted robbery is properly considered a 
violent offense. This is evidenced by the 1995 legislative amendment to the robbery statute, 
which now incorporates attempted robbery as a complete, violent offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-301 (1995). 
7. The purpose of the habitual offender statute is to subject persistent offenders to 
greater sanctions. 
8. Defendant is a persistent offender. Based on the nature and substance of the 
offenses for which Defendant has been convicted, this Court finds that Defendant is not amenable 
to rehabilitation. 
9. Because attempted robbery is currently defined as a violent offense, and Defendant 
has previously been convicted of attempted robbery and of burglary, another violent offense, 
Defendant is properly charged with being an habitual violent offender under the new habitual 
offender statute. 
3 
ORDER 
Therefore, this Court determines that the Defendant is properly charged, and accordingly 
sentenced, with being an habitual criminal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5 (1995). 
DATED this day of July, 1996. 
MICHAEL D. LYON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved aA to form. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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1 ,!
 THE COURT: This is the time set for sentencing in 
2
 I  the matter of State of Utah vs. David A. Gallegos. Counsel, ij 
3
 (I have read both of your memoranda that have been submitted to 
4
 " me. I assume you would like a chance to argue briefly before 
5
 || the Court imposes sentence 
5
 MR. CAINE: We would 
7
 || THE COURT: I will hear you. Go ahead, Mr. Heward 
MR. HEWARD: Thank you, your Honor. It is the time 
set for sentencing on Mr. Gallegos. You are well acquainted 
with the facts in this case, and you are also well acquainted 
with Mr. Gallegos based not only upon the pre-sentence report, 
but based upon the numerous felony convictions that have gone 
13
 || through this court, both by plea and by Jury determination 
14 !l
 since December of 1994 when this offense occurred 
15
 || I think all of that is important, what's happened since 
then in addition to what happened before, when you look at and 
try and determine whether or not under the current state of 
the law this Defendant is eligible to be sentenced as a 
habitual criminal 
As the Court is well aware we have been here for a time 
period and there has been a determination by your Honor after 
briefing from the State that the appropriate law to apply to 
Mr. Gallegos is the law that was enacted in the spring of 
1995. The reason for that, I believe you adopted the 
reasoning of the State, wasn't necessarily we wanted the law 
2| 
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to apply to him, but felt like that's what the law mandated. 
The change in the habitual criminal statute was procedural as 
opposed to substantive. Therefore they would apply to the 
Defendant. There were some changes in the way the habitual 
5
 I  criminal statute was to be applied, most specifically as we 
directed in the brief going away from the second degree felon^ j 
requirement, any second degree felony requirement, and 
 I specifically indicating that an individual must be convicted 
of what is enumerated as a violent offense. And there is 
quite a list that is indicated there. 
We believe that it is very important, your Honor, that 
specifically the same year that the changes or the amendments 
to that statute took place, also the changes or amendments 
took place to the crime of robbery. Specifically when Mr. 
Gallegos was convicted back in 1981 or thereabouts of 
attempted robbery, attempted robbery was a separate and 
distinct offense from the crime of robbery. And as Mr. Caine 
pointed out in his response, it was covered by a specific 
section. It still is a specific section setting out what is 
required for an attempt, as opposed to the completion of the 
act. 
The Legislature looked at that, your Honor, and it would 
be our position made a determination that if someone goes out 
and attempts to commit a robbery they are acting with the same] 
mens re, they are putting individuals in the same position of 
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force or fear, and they are doing the same types of things as 
far as trying to get person property from the person. The 
fact that they don't succeed in that, the Legislature's change 
would indicate we believe that they view that as being 
essentially the same conduct. And consequently they changed 
the law. They amended it as we specifically said. An 
attempted robbery is all that is required for the completion 
of the act. 
The reason why we feel that is important that the 
Legislature has indicated what its intent is by doing that is 
they do not specifically list attempted robbery as one of the 
enumerated offenses under the current statute. It is our 
position they don't need to list it, or their view was they 
didn't need to list it, because robbery is done or can be 
completed by an attempt just as it can by the completed act. 
It is also clear, your Honor, that it is the Legislative 
intent to apply habitual criminal status to individuals in thd 
case that we cited you to, specifically to make persistent 
offenders subject to greater sanctions. There is no question 
that David Gallegos is a persistent offender. And so we thinld 
it important when you look at Legislative intent—when I refer; 
to that specific language, make persistent offenders subject 
to greater sanctions, that's coming out of the State vs. 
Montague, which is one of the cases we cited you to. 
We also feel it is important, when looking at all the 
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facts and circumstances, to look at whether or not, even 
though not specifically enumerated, attempted robbery is a 
violent felony which they have determined what people will be 
subject to greater penalty for. Again when you look at the 
cases that we have given you, the Gurr case, it becomes very 
clear that it is the substance of the offense, not what it is 
called, that makes something a violent felony. And they gave 
you several different examples of that. 
When you look at all those types of things, and what it 
is that the Legislature is attempting to do, as we put forth 
in our brief, it is our position that the spirit of the law is 
to treat individuals in Mr. Gallegos' position as persistent 
violent offenders, which they are. We do not believe because 
it is not specifically enumerated as attempted robbery, again 
because of the change, that this is someone who should have 
the benefit of the straddling the position or putting forth 
the position that he is. And that is that it is not 
specifically enumerated, I did it prior to the enactment of 
the law, and therefore it shouldn't apply to me. 
Mr. Gallegos is exactly the kind of individual who we 
believe this Court needs to give the Board of Pardons the 
opportunity to control for the rest of his life, whether that 
is in a prison setting or whether that is in a parole setting 
He has shown through his entire life that he is not someone 
that can function without some very serious structure, whether! 
it is in the form of incarceration or the form of parole. 
It would be our position, your Honor, that Mr. Gallegos 
is in fact an habitual criminal, and Mr. Gallegos* conduct is 
exactly the kind of conduct that the Legislature intended you 
to apply habitual offender status to. We do not believe that 
it is determinative that it doesn't say attempted robbery as 
one of the enumerated offenses. Again, as I indicated, 
because of specifically the change in the law. 
And because of those reasons, your Honor, because of the 
arguments that we have set forth—and one additional one I 
failed to mention. But what is set out is that Mr. Gallegos 
committed attempted robbery in another State. When you go to 
the statute listing enumerated offenses, the very last 
paragraph that follows that indicates that other offenses 
committed in other states will be considered violent offenses 
if they would be considered a violent offense here. If he 
committed that attempted robbery in 1981 in the State of 
Colorado or Wyoming or Idaho or anywhere else, and you were 
trying to determine is it a violent offense, because of the 
case authority we have cited we believe that would be 
considered a violent offense and not the designation of 
attempt or robbery would be determinative. But what is the 
substance of the offense. 
When you look at all of those, and what the real intent 
of the Legislature is, we believe they do intend habitual 
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criminal to apply to Mr. Gailegos. We ask you to apply it. 
Specifically we ask you tcr apply it consecutive to what he is 
currently doing. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Caine. 
MR. CAINE: Thank you. 
Mr. Heward, as he usually does, has written an excellent 
memorandum. And in addressing it, I think I have 
philosophically a little different view. And that is it seems 
to me that this isn't a situation of you having to decide 
whether Mr. Gallegos fits the type of person that this statut^ 
was enacted to apply to. I think the habitual criminal 
statute is either you are or you aren't, based upon the 
statutory definitions of what an habitual criminal is. 
And we have a problem in this case because we have had 
two changes in the law, both of which pertain to this case. 
And I tried to look in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme 
Court since 1995 when both the robbery and the new habitual 
criminal section came in to see if either of those courts had 
specifically addressed the dichotomy that I see here. And 
they have not. So this is truly a case of first impression, 
at least on this issue. And I agree with Mr. Heward, at this 
point it would be easy had the prior habitual criminal statute) 
that was in effect up until 1995 been applicable in this case. 
There would be no argument here. There is no question because] 
of the definitions that were used in that statute that the twq 
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wouldn't have otherwise have suffered. Under the old statute 
he plainly would have been determined an habitual criminal. 
It is my interpretation of the statute, in looking at 
what I think was the Legislative intent, which is shored up in) 
5
 [I the Court's mind because it changed the definition of the 
robbery statute at the same time, that the Legislature 
intended to include attempted robbery as a violent felony. 
I believe that looking at the Defendant's record that he 
9
 || is a persistent offender, one who the Legislature intended to 
10
 I target when they passed this statute. 
11
 I I therefore find him this morning to be an habitual 
12
 || criminal under Section 76-6-301 
13
 II MR. HEWARD: Would—habitual criminal I believe is 
76-3-302.5. Are you referring to the robbery section, 76-6? 
THE COURT: Well, I have written down the wrong 
16
 section. Whatever the current statute is. I read them both 
this morning, and I am satisfied that he is an habitual 
criminal. That's the finding of the Court, as well as the 
legal conclusion the Court reaches in terms of the offender 
status. It is therefore—Mr. Gallegos, would you stand, 
please--my finding that you serve—and based on the nature of 
these offense and your history and your character and the fact| 
23
 || that you do not seem to be amenable to rehabilitation through 
the criminal justice system in the past, the Court imposes twoj 
consecutive five years to life sentences on the third degree 
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felony convictions that were entered in this Court. 
The Court will run concurrent— 
MR. CAINE: Your Honor, excuse me, I think we 
better—so the record is clarified, we have one second degree 
felony and one class B misdemeanor. 
MR. HEWARD: The theft conviction was a class B. 
7
 || MR. CAINE: So one 5 to life. 
MR. HEWARD: I do not believe the enhancement 
provisions would apply to the misdemeanor. 
MR. CAINE: That!s correct. 
THE COURT: I have got the wrong report then. I 
have got—the report that I am looking at—was he sentenced in) 
January? 
MR. HEWARD: Yes, on other offenses. 
MR. CAINE : That's what happened. We didn't 
actually have a new report on this. 
THE COURT: Okay. Tell me again, refresh my memory, 
this is the attempted—there was a robbery. 
MR. CAINE: No, he was convicted of burglary. 
THE COURT: Burglary. 
MR. CAINE: A second degree felony, which would now 
be enhanced. 
THE COURT 
MR. CAINE 
THE COURT 
That was with his brother Joseph? 
That's correct. 
June 21—I am sorry, May 20th. 
15, 
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MR. CAINE: Based upon your ruling that would be 
enhanced to 5 to life. He "was also convicted of theft, a 
class B misdemeanor. I think Mr. Reward is right, that 
doesn!t apply in the enhancement section. 
THE COURT: Okay, that is correct. And under the 
statute a 1 to 15 is enhanced to 5 years to life. 
All right, then the Court amends the sentence and imposesj 
one sentence of 5 years to life on the burglary conviction 
that was rendered in this Court in June, and runs concurrently] 
the sentence of 6 months in jail on the class B misdemeanor 
conviction 
Now, he was — 
13
 || MR. CAINE: You had previously— 
14
 " THE COURT: I sentenced him previously in January 
then on the third degree felony convictions for possession of 
a controlled substance 
MR. HEWARD: Those would not be offenses that I 
think are enumerated under the violent offender statute. I 
don't think you can go back and enhance those. 
THE COURT: That goes back to the question I have. 
Isn't he on parole? 
MR. GALLEGOS: I haven't been on parole for three 
years. 
MR. HEWARD: He was not on parole when this offense 
occurred. 
16 
MR, CAINE: The ofTenses you had— 
THE COURT: When did the burglary occur? 
MR, HEWARD: The burglary was December of 1994. We 
had an original trial date in June of 1995- Mr. Gallegos 
5
 || absconded or failed to show up. The bail jumping issued 
between—the bail jumping issued. He committed new offenses. 
Pled guilty to the bail jumping. Was sentenced on that. Went! 
8
 j| to trial on the drug offenses before your Honor. Was 
convicted of some of those. He was sentenced on the bail 
jumping. That occurred after this. And also the other 
offenses after this. 
THE COURT: That's clear. But he has been sentenced] 
13
 I  on the others. And I will make those sentences run 
consecutive. This sentence run consecutive to what he has 
previously been sentenced to by me in January of this year. 
MR. HEWARD: Just one procedural question. I raised) 
this when we were here I believe on the 13th when we set this 
over for a special hearing. I just want to make sure we have 
a complete record. 
We have not presented any evidence—and Mr. Caine 
indicated for purposes of today that it was for legal 
arguments only. What I am not sure of is whether we have a 
stipulation, which I believe would be sufficient, as to the 
Defendant's prior convictions,, the 1981 attempted robbery and 
the subsequent burglary, both of which resulted in him being 
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sentenced to the Utah State Prison. I am not sure we have a 
stipulation and/or evidence before Your Honor necessary for 
you to make this. The Court is aware of what those are. 
THE COURT: Except I think Mr. Caine indicated— 
MR. CAINE: Those— 
THE COURT: Paragraphs 1 through 5, he agreed with. 
MR. CAINE: That's right, I accepted that as the 
stipulated— 
MR. HEWARD: Great. I wanted to make sure that 
became a part of the record. And your Honor is specifically 
referring to paragraphs 1 through 5 in the memorandum the 
State submitted talking about his prior history. 
THE COURT: That was the statement of facts the 
Court accepted, and upon which it based its decision. 
MR. HEWARD: Thank you. 
MR. CAINE: That's correct. The only thing I ask, 
because I contemplate there is going to be an appeal, I don't 
know whether it may be proper for the State to do it, we would 
probably want to have in this case Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law,, based upon your decision on this 
particular issue so that that could be signed and filed. 
MR. HEWARD: And I am happy to prepare those. 
THE COURT: Why don't you include in the Findings 
then the robbery conviction—excuse me, the burglary 
conviction, and then also the convictions in January for the 
18 
drug charges so it is clear also where the Court imposed the 
consecutive sentences. 
MR. CAINE: That will be fine. Thank you, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court does that under the provisions; 
of 76-3-501. Why I imposed consecutive sentences, this is a j 
serious offense. In looking at his past history and 
rehabilitative needs, I think it is appropriate for [ 
consecutive sentences. Just looking at the totality of his j 
record, this man has been frankly a burden to the criminal 
justice system for many, many years. I don't think the 
sentences that I have imposed are oppressive or inequitable ini 
any way. j 
MR. REWARD: Thank you. | 
19 
35 
SO --
THE COURT: IT'g MY RECOLLECTION THAT WHEN THERE WAS 
A MOTION PREVIOUSLY BY YOU TO EXCLUDE THE EVIDENCE, THAT WAS 
THE BASIS FOR MISTRIAL BEFORE. 
MR. CAINE: THAT'S CORRECT. 
THE COURT: THAT WHEN I GOT BACK ON THE BENCH, I GOT 
LOOKING AT SOME OF THE ANNOTATIONS IN THE CASES AND CONCLUDED 
THAT I HAD ERRED AS TO THE OBJECTION THAT YOU HAD PREVIOUSLY 
9II MADE, SO THAT I HAD CALLED A RECESS, BROUGHT US INTO CHAMBERS. 
10 I DISCUSSED WITH YOU WHAT I FELT WAS THE LAW AT THAT TIMS. 
11 AND MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT YOU MADE A MOTION FOR MISTRIAL, IS 
12 THAT CORRECT --
13 MR. CAINE: THAT'S CORRECT. 
14 THE COURT: --MR. CAINE? AND I BELIEVE THAT WHERE 
15 THE DEFENDANT MOVES FOR A MISTRIAL, THE COURT GRANTS IT, THAT 
16 THERE IS NOT JEOPARDY ATTACHING. 
17 MR. CAINE: OKAY. LET'S GO FORWARD. 
18 THE COURT: ON THE SUBSTANTIVE BASIS AS WELL AS THE 
19 PROCEDURAL BASIS NOTED BY THE PROSECUTOR, I DENY THE MOTION. 
20 OPEN COURT 
21 (WHEREUPON THE COURT READ THE PRELIMINARY 
22 JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.) 
23 THE COURT: MR. HEWARD, WE'LL BEGIN WITH YOU PLEASE. 
24 MR. HEWARD: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. DECEMBER 11, 
25 1994 APPROXIMATELY 1:00 A.M. IN THE MORNING, SHARON STEVENSON 
175 
1 THE COURT: RECORD MAY SHOW THAT THE JURY HAS 
2 RETURNED TO THE COURTROOM. HAVE YOU CHOSEN ONE OF YOUR 
3 MEMBERS TO BE FOREPERSON? VERY GOOD. HAVE YOU REACHED A 
4 VERDICT, SIR? 
5 MR. BARRETT: YES, WE HAVE. 
6 THE COURT: WOULD YOU HAND THAT TO THE BAILIFF 
7 PLEASE? 
8 THE BAILIFF: HAND ME EVERYTHING PLEASE. I'LL TAKE IT 
9 ALL. THANK YOU. 
10 THE COURT: IT DOES APPEAR THAT THE JURY HAS REACHED 
11 A VERDICT. WOULD YOU RISE, MR. GALLEGOS? VERDICT FORM READS, 
12 WE THE JURY IMPANELED TO TRY THE ISSUES IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
13 MATTER DO HEREBY FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF COUNT ONE, 
14 BURGLARY, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. AND GUILTY OF COUNT TWO, 
15 THEFT, A CLASS-B MISDEMEANOR. 
16 WOULD YOU LIKE THE JURY POLLED, MR. CAINE? 
17 MR. CAINE: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
18 THE COURT: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THANK YOU VERY 
19 MUCH FOR YOUR SERVICE THESE PAST TWO DAYS. WE APPRECIATE THE 
20 ATTENTION THAT YOU HAVE SHOWN. I WATCHED YOU DURING THE TRIAL 
21 AND YOU'VE BEEN OBVIOUSLY INTERESTED AND ENGAGED IN THIS CASE 
22 AND I APPRECIATE THE SACRIFICES THAT YOU PERHAPS PERSONALLY 
23 HAVE MADE TO SERVE. I APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS VERY VERY MUCH. 
24 I'M NOW GOING TO EXCUSE YOU WITH MY SINCERE THANKS. AT THIS 
2 5 POINT, YOU'RE FREE TO TALK ABOUT THE CASE WITH ANYONE AND 
